I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960s, educators have enjoyed a significant (if confusing) array of First Amendment privileges.' The confusion resulted from tensions between principles of academic freedom (both of the educator and the educational institution) and the public-employee-speech doctrine.' [Vol. 63:761 The Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos 4 threw approximately forty years of First Amendment protections for educators into grave doubt.' While Garcetti explicitly declined to address the unique situation of educators, at least with respect to academic freedom issues, 6 the Eleventh Circuit lost no time in adapting the Garcetti reasoning to educational settings, however inexact the fit. 7 This article begins by examining the various doctrinal threads that previously comprised First Amendment protections for educators, and then analyzes how Garcetti and the Eleventh Circuit's incorporation of Garcetti into its jurisprudence jeopardize important First Amendment rights in the educational setting. The article concludes with a proposal for re-thinking the Eleventh Circuit's First Amendment jurisprudence as it applies to educators.
II. PRE-GARCETTi FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF

EDUCATORS IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
The First Amendment rights of educators spring from and are limited by several different sources. One source of such rights is the recognition that academic freedom is protected by the First Amendment in public education settings. 8 The right of educators to First Amendment protection also stems from the public-forum 9 and private-speaker' 0 doc- 6. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 ("There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.").
7 581 (1972) (distinguishing between public and private schools and colleges and recognizing that First Amendment protects academic freedom of teachers in public institutions).
9. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981) ("This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum.").
10. Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2004 ) (schoolteacher's participation in afterschool religious group meetings on school property were "private speech" and thus not prohibited by Establishment Clause); Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1050 (6th Cir. 2001 ) (schoolteacher's decision to bring speakers to class who presented information to students on the environmental benefits of industrial hemp constituted speech); Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Because of the special characteristics of a classroom environment . . . we distinguish between teachers' classroom trines and, to some degree, is informed by student free-speech rights." Educators' First Amendment rights have been limited by the educational institution's rights to determine its curriculum, 2 to inculcate community values in the young,1 3 and to act as a public employer in exercising workplace control. 4 Each of these interests will be discussed below. 5 the first of a series of cases in which educators were subject to dismissal or discipline for failing to demonstrate fealty to the United States government by taking a loyalty oath or for belonging to "subversive" organizations. In Adler, Justices Douglas and Black failed to convince a majority of the Court that the academic freedom of New York public school teachers included the right to be free from government inquiry or intrusion into their memberships and associations, and that academic freedom was constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.' 6 The majority held that although educators "have the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will.... they have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms."' 7 In reaching this conclusion the majority rather emphatically dismissed the idea that teachers (at least public elementary and secondary teachers) enjoy any individual academic freedom protected by expression and teachers' expression in other situations that would not reasonably be perceived as school-sponsored.").
A. Academic Freedom in the Eleventh
11. Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. Rav. 63, 79-87 (2008) (identifying split among the circuits over whether student-speech doctrine in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier applies to teachers, and arguing that Hazelwood should apply only to student speech cases).
12. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 608 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) ("the discretion of state and local authorities over public school curricula is broad"); Grossman v. S. Shore Pub. Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1097, 1100 (7th ) ("The First Amendment is 'not a teacher license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular content."').
13. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 285 (1988) (acknowledging state's "undeniable, and undeniably vital, mandate to inculcate moral and political values" in the public education setting).
14. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968 the First Amendment.' 8 The same year as Adler, the Court struck a similar loyalty oath applied to educators in Wieman v. Updegraff, 9 but on the basis of due process rather than the First Amendment. 2 
"
However, within only a few years, the Court began to recognize First Amendment protections for the academic freedom of teachers. 2 [o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 18. Id. at 493 ("A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted. One's associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty. . . . [W]e know of no rule, constitutional or otherwise, that prevents the state, when determining the fitness and loyalty of such persons, from considering the organizations and persons with whom they associate."). The differences between the First Amendment freedoms of elementary and secondary teachers and those of college and university teachers are discussed later in this section. See infra discussion accompanying notes 27-46.
19 48 This line of cases has become so significant that one scholar has concluded that, of late, "the Supreme Court's decisions concerning academic freedom have protected principally and expressly a First Amendment right of the university itself-understood in its corporate capacity-largely to be free from government interference in the performance of core educational functions." 4 9 Affording such First Amendment rights to the educational institution is inevitably in tension with the individual educator's academic freedom. 5 " In his dissent in Adler, Justice Frankfurter aptly described the tension between the right of the sovereign (in this case the educational institution) and the teacher as one of the deepest interests of a democratic society: its right to self-preservation and ample scope for the individual's freedom, especially the teacher's freedom of thought, inquiry and expression. No problem of a free society is probably more difficult than the reconciliation or accommodation of these too often conflicting interests. 5 The Eleventh Circuit has recognized the academy's First Amendment right to academic freedom, albeit without acknowledging the 47. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 48. "Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body." Id. [c]urricula design has historically been left to the university. One of the central tenets of academic freedom is the right to decide matters of course content. Such freedom is essential to guarantee the unimpeded exchange of ideas. It is not the duty of a federal court to dictate to a university the content of its curriculum; such decisions belong to the institution's faculty. 53 The Eleventh Circuit failed to acknowledge, however, that the academic choices made by the faculty and the institution itself may differ. 
HAZELWOOD' S IMPACT
Complicating the inherent tensions between the academic freedom of teachers and the educational institution still further is the Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 55 and the Eleventh Circuit's confused applications of that case to teachers. In Hazelwood, high school journalism students who wrote for the school newspaper challenged the school principal's censorship of newspaper articles dealing with the experiences of pregnant Hazelwood high-school students and the impact of divorce on students. 5 6 In determining that the principal's actions withstood First Amendment scrutiny, the Supreme Court distinguished between a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises ...
[and] school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences. 57 Hazelwood limited Tinker's material-and-substantial-interference test for balancing the First Amendment rights of students against the interests of the school administration and authorized-in a curricular setting reasonably perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school-curtailment of student expression as long as it is "reasonably related to legitimate 52. 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994 The circuit courts have split in their interpretations of Hazelwood, particularly about whether it permits suppression of speech based on viewpoint and whether and how the decision interacts with the academic freedom of teachers. 59 The Eleventh Circuit's post-Hazelwood decisions make clear that the principles announced in Hazelwood apply to "school-sponsored expression that occurs in the context of a curricular activity .... Hazelwood controls all expression that (1) bears the imprimatur of the school, and (2) occurs in a curricular activity." 6° But, in the Eleventh Circuit, "Hazelwood does not allow a school to censor schoolsponsored speech based on viewpoint." 6 The Eleventh Circuit has been less consistent in its consideration of 
B. The Public-Employee-Speech Doctrine in the Eleventh Circuit
The last of the threads woven into the confusing cloth of First Amendment protections for educators is the public-employee-speech doctrine that was first announced in Pickering, 76 and modified by Connick v. Myers . 77 Essential to an understanding of this doctrine, as it impacts educators, is the factual context in which each of the cases reached the Supreme Court.
PICKERING V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
Marvin Pickering was a public high-school teacher in Will County, Illinois. He was fired by the Board of Education after he wrote a letter to the editor of the local newspaper in connection with a "proposed tax increase that was critical of the way in which the Board and the district superintendent of schools had handled past proposals to raise new revenue for the schools. 78 Pickering specifically noted that he was signing the letter "as a citizen, taxpayer and voter, not as a teacher. '79 The Board found that "publication of the letter was 'detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district' and ... that 72. Waldman, supra note 11, at 66 (arguing that "Hazelwood's reach has been significantly overextended and that it should be applied only in student speech cases. Hazelwood was a student speech case, and its rationale and approach are uniquely suited to that context").
73 8 " The Court framed the problem as "to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." 82 In Pickering's case, the Court struck the balance in his favor, because it found that Pickering was commenting on a matter of general public interest 8 3 and that, since the statements were critical of the Board and the Superintendent, they were "in no way directed towards any person with whom appellant would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work .... Thus no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers" was presented. 8 4 As to the Board of Education's claim that Pickering's letter was "detrimental," the Court found that this improperly equated "the Board members' own interests with that of the schools." 8 5 Instead, the Court found that an accusation that too much money is being spent on athletics by the administrators of the school system . . . cannot reasonably be regarded as per se detrimental to the district's schools. Such an accusation reflects rather a difference of opinion between Pickering and the Board as to the preferable manner of operating the school system, a difference of opinion that clearly concerns an issue of general public interest.
8 6
In its conclusion, the Court emphasized both the importance of debate on matters of public concern in our democracy and the unique circumstances of teachers in that debate.
[T]he question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment of the school administration, including the School Board, cannot, in a society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive. community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal. 
96 In 1980, Myers was informed that she would be transferred to prosecute cases in a different section of the criminal court. She opposed the transfer and expressed her view to several of her supervisors, including Connick, who urged her to accept the transfer. When her opposition was unavailing, she prepared a questionnaire "soliciting the views of her fellow staff members concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns., 97 Myers distributed the questionnaire to fifteen assistant district attorneys. When Dennis Waldron, a first assistant district attorney, learned that Myers was distributing the survey he immediately phoned Connick and informed him that Myers was creating a "mini-insurrection" within the office. 98 Connick fired Myers and maintained that he did so "because of her refusal to accept the transfer. She was also told that her distribution of the questionnaire was considered an act of insubordination." 99 Myers sued, claiming that her termination was in violation of her constitutionally-protected right of free speech. Applying Pickering, the District Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana, and, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit, agreed. On review, the Supreme Court refined the Pickering balancing test and held that the lower courts had "erred in striking the balance for [Myers] ."'" Modifying the Pickering balancing test, the Court held that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.' 1 The Court then proceeded to offer guidance on how courts should determine whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern. It advised that this determination should be based on "the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." 102 Applying this analysis to Myers's questionnaire, the Court determined that only the question inquiring about whether assistant district attorneys feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office-supported candidates presented a question of "public concern."' 0 3 The Court cautioned:
To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark-and certainly every criticism directed at a public officialwould plant the seed of a constitutional case. While as a matter of good judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.' 0 4 Thus, the Supreme Court struck the balance in Connick's favor, rather than in Myers's. Recognizing that the questionnaire did not impede Myers's ability to perform her job duties, the Court deferred to "Connick's judgment. . . that Myers' questionnaire was an act of insubordination which interfered with working relationships. When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment is appropriate." ' However, the Court cautioned "that a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public concern.
' "106 Thus, had Myers's questionnaire focused more on political pressure and less on her internal office grievances, then the Court might well have struck the balance in her favor.
APPLICATION OF PICKERING-CONNICK IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
The Eleventh Circuit struggled with the meaning of Pickering as modified by Connick. In 1987, Judge Kravitch aptly described the "proper juxtaposition" of these cases as "somewhat unclear." ' evolved a four part test to determine whether a public employer violates the free speech rights of its employees.
In Leonard v. City of Columbus,'°8 the Court indicated that a public employee must first demonstrate that the allegedly protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the dismissal, then the court must apply the Pickering balancing test to determine whether the speech activity was protected, then defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse action would have occurred in the absence of the protected speech. 1 0 9 Next, in Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 1 0 the Court indicated that the first step in assessing public-employee-free-speech claim is to determine whether speech relates to a matter of public concern. 1 In Holley v. Seminole County School District, 112 the Court, following Mt. Healthy, determined that once a plaintiff establishes that speech is protected, the burden shifts to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action in absence of the protected activity. 113 Ferrara v. Mills 1 4 held that a public-employee plaintiff must first show that their speech was on a matter of public concern, then that their speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the employment decision. If both of these showings are made, then the courts should apply the Pickering balancing test to determine whether the adverse employment decision was "justified."' 15 In Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 1 6 the Eleventh Circuit departed from the reasoning of other circuits and determined that the Pickering balancing test is not employed to determine whether the speech is constitutionally protected. Rather, if the speech relates to a matter of public concern, the speech is constitutionally protected irrespective of any balancing of interests." 7 The case of Morales v. Stierheim" 8 declared that a plaintiff must first show that the speech was on a matter of public concern, 1 9 and that the statements were a substantial motivating factor in the public employer's decision. 1 2 0 Once the employee has made this showing, then the Pickering balancing process is triggered and deter- mined by the following considerations: "(1) whether the speech at issue impedes the government's ability to perform its duties efficiently, (2) the manner, time and place of the speech, and (3) the context within which the speech was made."' 2 1
While none of the foregoing cases addressed the unique status of educators, the Eleventh Circuit considered this issue in Kurtz v. Vickrey.1 22 Kurtz was a public-university professor who claimed he was denied promotion to full professor because of his criticisms of the university and his participation in a lawsuit against it. Kurtz was critical of the university's failure to make salary information and how it was spending public funds available to the public. Kurtz argued that "too much money was being spent on 'window dressing' the university's physical plant, rather than on education itself."' ' 23 Kurtz was also critical of the university president's personal management style. 1 24 He directed these criticisms primarily to the president (Vickrey). In addition, Kurtz participated in a lawsuit filed against the university by its educational association, which sought to compel the university to disclose its salary information and how it determined salary.' 25 After Kurtz was denied promotion, he filed suit claiming the denial of promotion was based on his protected speech and his participation in the suit seeking disclosure of salary levels.
126
The district court dismissed the first component of Kurtz's claim because it found that "Kurtz's dialogue with Vickrey did not relate to matters of public concern."' 27 In reviewing this decision, the Eleventh Circuit staked out its difference with other circuits in the interpretation of the Pickering-Connick line of cases:
Because of the ease with which any complaint about the management of government office could be termed a matter of public concern, some courts, in making such determinations, have focused on The Eleventh Circuit then determined that Kurtz's "criticism of the university's spending priorities related to a matter of public concern."' 3°T he Court based its decision on the fact that "Kurtz's complaints were directed at matters beyond the scope of internal management. There is an indication that during the relevant period, the university was going through a 'financial crisis.' The financial failure of a state university certainly would be a matter of public concern." ' 
131
Having determined that Kurtz's speech addressed a matter of public concern, the Court proceeded to set forth the rudiments of what would eventually become the Eleventh Circuit's four-part Pickering-Connick analysis:
128. Id. at 727. 129. Id. (citation omitted). 130. Id. at 730 ("For instance, Kurtz complained about the proposed closing of a branch of the university. He also disagreed with the use of university funds to contribute to the purchase of a fire truck for the community.").
131. Id.
Once a plaintiff makes the threshold showing that the speech at issue relates to a matter of public concern, the court must turn to the three step process for reviewing an employee's claim of retaliation for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. To prevail under this analysis, an employee must show that: (1) the speech involved a matter of public concern; (2) the employee's free speech interests outweighed the employer's interest in effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities; and (3) the speech played a substantial part in the adverse employment action. If an employee satisfies her burden on the first three steps, the burden then shifts to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of the protected speech. The first two steps are questions of law; the final two steps are "questions of fact designed to determine whether the alleged adverse employment action was in retaliation for the protected speech." 1 34
Significantly, in an unpublished decision issued less than a year after Cook and shortly before the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti, the Eleventh Circuit applied this analysis to an educator's speech rights.
3 5 Eddie Tucker was Coordinator of the Continuous Learning
Center in the Talladega City school system. He sued after he was fired from his position, alleging, inter alia, that he was terminated because of statements he made "urging more hiring of minorities, and expressing his concern about the treatment of minority students."' 3 6 The Eleventh Circuit first referenced its four-part "Pickering/Connick test,"' 1 37 and had no trouble accepting the defendants' concession that Tucker's speech involved a matter of public concern or that Tucker's free speech interests outweighed the defendant's interests in the effective and efficient administration of the school, satisfying steps one and two of the Eleventh Circuit's four-part test.' 38 The Court then upheld-in an interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of defendant's claim of qualified immunity-the district court's determination that "a reasonable jury could find a causal connection between Tucker's protected speech and his termination," thus satisfying steps three and four of the four-part test. 39 The specific speech at issue in Tucker, as recounted by the Court, consisted of "statements Tucker made urging more hiring of minorities and expressing his concern about the treatment of minority students and students at the [school],"' 4° filing complaints with the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights and the EEOC,' 4 1 criticizing the school "over which he presides" and "giving a poor impression of the school board."' 4 2 As discussed below, the Eleventh Circuit's view of this speech as within the First Amendment protected parameters for educators might have been radically different if the Court had considered the case only a few months later, after the Garcetti decision 14 3 was announced by the Supreme Court. 44 
III. GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS 14 5
Richard Ceballos was an experienced deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office. He was working as a calendar deputy, which required him to exercise "certain supervisory 137 . Id. at 292 ("[A]n employee must show that: '(1) the speech involved a matter of public concern; (2) the employee's free speech interests outweighed the employer's interest in effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities; and (3) the speech played a substantial part in the adverse employment action.' The burden then shifts to the employer to show (4) that it would have made the same decision even absent the protected speech. The first two factors are questions of law, commonly referred to as the Pickering/Connick test. The latter two are questions of fact that go to 'whether the alleged adverse employment action was in retaliation for the protected speech.'") (quoting Cook, 414 F.3d at 1318) (citations omitted).
138. Id. 139. Id. at 293. While conceding that Tucker had engaged in protected speech, which did not disrupt the operation of the school, the defendant had argued that it fired him for insubordination rather than in retaliation for the protected speech. responsibilities over other lawyers. "146 A defense attorney contacted Ceballos and asked him to review claimed inaccuracies in an affidavit used to obtain a critical search warrant. Ceballos did so, and determined the affidavit contained "serious misrepresentations."' ' 4 7 He spoke to the warrant affiant in the sheriffs department, but was dissatisfied with the explanation. Ceballos then relayed his findings to his supervisors by a memo, which explained his concerns and recommended dismissal of the case. Eventually, a meeting was held between Ceballos, his supervisors, the warrant affiant, and others from the sheriff's department. The meeting became "heated." Thereafter, Ceballos's supervisor decided to proceed with the prosecution in spite of Ceballos's concerns.' 4 8
Ceballos was called by the defense to testify in the trial court about his observations concerning the warrant. 49 Ceballos claimed that after these events the District Attorney retaliated against him by transferring and reassigning him and denying him a promotion. He alleged that the retaliation was based on his memo about the warrant and violated his First Amendment rights.'
50
Relying on Pickering and Connick and its own case law interpreting those doctrines, the Ninth Circuit held that "Ceballos's allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum constitute protected speech under the First Amendment."' 5 ' The Ninth Circuit determined that Ceballos's memo, reciting what he viewed as governmental misconduct, was "inherently a matter of public concern." 152 The Ninth Circuit did not address whether the speech was made in Ceballos's capacity as a citizen, relying on its own Circuit precedent which rejected the idea that "a public employee's speech is deprived of First Amendment protection whenever those views are expressed, to government workers or others, pursuant to an employment responsibility."' 153 This Ninth Circuit precedent is similar to that of the pre-Garcetti Eleventh Circuit.' 5 4
The Supreme Court rejected this determination. In the majority's decision, authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court refocused the Picker- ing-Connick inquiry by interjecting an additional threshold hurdle: In order to enjoy any First Amendment protection, the public employee must establish that the speech was made "as a citizen" and not as part of the employee's job duties.' 5 5 The Supreme Court thus reversed the Ninth Circuit's extension of First Amendment protection to Ceballos because "his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy ....
[T]he fact that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a [job] responsibility.., distinguishes Ceballos' case from those in which the First Amendment provides protection against discipline."' 5 6 The Court proceeded to announce a new bright-line test for the publicemployee-free-speech doctrine: "We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline."' 57 The majority included in dicta a broad-sweeping and inaccurate reference to the government-speech doctrine without providing any further explanation or analysis:
Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. Four Justices dissented from the Court's holding. 159 Justice Souter, writing for three of them, was particularly troubled by the majority's reference to the government-speech doctrine and how the holding (including the dicta about government speech) might adversely affect educators' First Amendment freedoms. Referring to the government-155. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 ("Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify two inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech. The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer's reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. The question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.") (citations omitted speech discussion as a "fallacy propounded by the county petitioners and the Federal Government as amicus, '' 1 6 Justice Souter explained why the doctrine did not apply to this case and, indeed, applies to only a narrow spectrum of speech-"when the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes."' 6 1
Concerned about the potential dangers inherent in the majority's dicta on this point, Justice Souter warned that this expansive interpretation of government speech "portends a bloated notion of controllable government speech going well beyond the circumstances of this case." 1 6 ' He was particularly worried that:
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First Amendment is spacious enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor, and I have to hope that today's majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write "pursuant to official ... duties." the difference between this case and [government speaker cases] lies in the terms of the respective employees' jobs and, in particular, the extent to which those terms require espousal of a substantive position prescribed by the government in advance. Some public employees are hired to "promote a particular policy" by broadcasting a particular message set by the government, but not everyone working for the government, after all, is hired to speak from a government manifesto. [Vol. 63:761 dicta discussed above and aptly criticized by Justice Souter, 164 the decision also contains self-limiting language that must be carefully considered by the circuit courts going forward. The majority continued to recognize not only Pickering and Connick as good law, but also Givhan, stating that the fact that "Ceballos expressed his views inside his office, rather than publicly, is not dispositive [on the question of whether his speech was made pursuant to his official duties]. Employees in some cases may receive First Amendment protection for expressions made at work." ' 16 5 The majority further noted that the fact that the memo "concerned the subject matter of Ceballos' employment," was nondispositive as to the "pursuant to official duties" question. Indeed, the majority referred to Givhan and teachers in general in noting that the "First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker's job."' 6 6
In his conclusion, Justice Kennedy responded to the dissent's concerns by noting that the parties in Garcetti had not disputed that Ceballos's memo was written pursuant to his official employment duties and therefore the Court did not "articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee's duties in cases where there is room for serious debate," ' Thus, Garcetti has provided considerable room for the circuit courts to carve out, as they did after both Pickering and Connick, their unique and circuit-specific determinations of the import of Garcetti. This is especially true in the circuit courts' consideration of the First Amendment rights of educators after Garcetti.
IV. THE POST-GARCETTI ERA
Early interpretations of Garcetti in the lower courts have varied widely. For example, the circuits have split over whether the question of the capacity in which a public employee speaks should be submitted to the trier of fact.
7 0 The circuits have also diverged in their assessment of
Garcetti's impact and application in academic settings." 7 ' Circuit inter-pretations of what falls under Garcetti's scope of "official duties" have also varied widely. 172 The remainder of this article will focus on how the Eleventh Circuit has viewed Garcetti thus far and make recommendations for the Circuit's future reading of the case in harmony with its own prior precedent and recognition of the unique free speech concerns of educators.
A. The Eleventh Circuit's Post-Garcetti Jurisprudence
Over the last two years, the Eleventh Circuit has had several occasions to consider the impact of Garcetti on its First Amendment jurisprudence. At the time of this writing, the Court has issued a dozen significant decisions based on Garcetti. 1 7 3 Only one of these cases, the first-Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County Board of Education1 7 4 -concerned the First Amendment rights of a teacher. 175 That unpublished decision was issued only a month after Garcetti; it contains little to no analysis concerning the capacity in which the teacher acted, 176 no discussion of whether educators enjoy any unique First Amendment rights, and no opinion as to the scope of those rights. 7 7 Therefore, in the Eleventh Circuit, the First Amendment rights of educators post-Garcetti remain to be determined, but may be hobbled by the exceptionally broad reading of Garcetti found in the Circuit's early interpretations outside the educational context.
In its decisions applying Garcetti thus far, the Eleventh Circuit has altogether ignored both the limiting language of the majority opinion discussed above' 7 8 and much of its former precedent. Indeed, in at least two such cases, the Court's interpretation of Garcetti's mandate resulted in a different result during the pendency of the litigation. In Akins v. Fulton County ("Akins r'), 7 9 the Eleventh Circuit, applying Pickering and Connick, ruled in favor of plaintiff purchasing and contracting employees who reported bidding and contracting irregularities, as well as work environment concerns, in a meeting with a Fulton County Commissioner and suffered adverse employment actions as a result. 8 0 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, stating that
The right implicated in this case is certainly a constitutionally protected right, entitling Plaintiffs to a determination of whether Gates has impermissibly infringed that right. See Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that "a core concern of the first amendment is the protection of the 'whistle-blower' attempting to expose government corruption").' 8 1 Unfortunately for the Akins plaintiffs, the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti was announced while their case was pending before the district court on remand and the district court reinstated its grant of summary judgment on the basis of Garcetti.1 82 This time, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court, disregarded its own precedent in Bryson, and expansively interpreted Garcetti to include virtually anything a public administrative responsibilities of Vila and D'Angelo, they are not dispositive with respect to freespeech rights in an educational setting for the reasons discussed below. See infra discussion accompanying notes 192-203. 176. Gilder-Lucas, 186 F. App'x. at 887 ("Because the record reveals no genuine question about whether Gilder-Lucas responded to [her principal's] questionnaire pursuant to her duty as a junior varsity cheerleader sponsor rather than as a citizen, the district court correctly granted summary judgment against Gilder-Lucas's claim under the First Amendment.").
177. [Vol. 63:761 employee might do on the job. Recognizing that Akins and other plaintiffs had no affirmative job duties requiring them to report these irregularities, 18 3 the Court manufactured a test never announced by the Supreme Court in Garcetti, which virtually every public employee is destined to fail: "the pithy inquiry here is not whether plaintiffs had an affirmative duty to report bid irregularities . . . but whether they made their statements to the commissioner as citizens who do not work for the government."
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The other post-Garcetti case that resulted in an about-face in defendant's favor, Khan v. Fernandez-Rundle, 185 also expanded Garcetti's reach further than the Supreme Court's decision. In Khan, the Eleventh Circuit expressed the view that Garcetti should be interpreted to deny First Amendment protection whenever "the public employee [acts] as an agent of the government at the time of the relevant speech."' 86 The Court in Khan went on to embrace the most expansive possible construction of the government-speech-doctrine dicta in Garcetti discussed above, 1 87 and criticized so cogently by the Garcetti dissent. 1 8 8 In taking this position, the Eleventh Circuit remarked "[e]ven Justice Souter recognized this basis for the Court's holding when he lamented in his dissenting opinion 'the fallacy ... that any statement made within the scope of public employment is (or should be treated as) the government's own speech.' " 189 The Eleventh Circuit's decision here elevates dicta from the majority opinion to a "basis for the Court's holding" that dangerously threatens to expand the government-speech doctrine in the Eleventh Circuit. Like Akins, Khan holds that a public employee's speech, even if unofficial, unenumerated, unexpected or unassigned, is sufficiently an "official duty" to eliminate the possibility of any First Amendment protection. 9 ' Indeed, in not a single case in which the question was contested did the Eleventh Circuit determine that a public employee's speech was outside of the employee's official duties.' 9 ' Vila v. Padrn 92 is a good example of the Court's reluctance to find any public employee's speech protected by the First Amendment. Vila was the Vice President of External Affairs for Miami-Dade Community College. She objected to what she believed were a number of unethical or illegal actions by the College and its President, Padr6n. i9 3 She reported an illegal contract to the College Provost, voiced concerns about hiring a negotiator at a meeting of the College Board, and informed the College's director of communications that it could not use College funds to illustrate a Trustee's daughter's poetry book.' 9 4 After she had voiced concerns to many persons within the College and on its high school principal, Michael D'Angelo, argued that he had been discharged in retaliation for his efforts to convert his school to a charter school. He met with teachers, consulted with principals of other schools, and held two faculty votes on the conversion. He claimed that his termination violated his rights to freedom of speech and association as protected by the First Amendment. 2°° While converting the school to charter status was clearly not one of his assigned job duties 2 ' (he was fired for these efforts, after all), the Eleventh Circuit nonetheless determined that these actions were undertaken as "official duties" because D'Angelo "admitted" that his number-one-job priority was to do whatever he could for the kids to succeed. 20 
B. Going Forward: Reconciling Educators' First Amendment Rights and Garcetti in the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit's early expansive reading of the Garcetti decision to shield most of the speech made by public employees from First Amendment analysis must be carefully re-thought when applied in an educational setting. Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's determination in Mayer v. Monroe County, 2 " Garcetti does not foreclose First Amendment protection for the academic (classroom and scholarship) speech of educators. Indeed, the Garcetti majority explicitly declined to do so. 2 " 5 In analyzing First Amendment protections for educators, the Eleventh Circuit should utilize the venerable test first enunciated by Judge Johnson in Parducci-a teacher's academic freedom should not be
